Why is the Bundeswehr still not a 'normal' instrument of foreign policy - despite the third fundamental reform in nearly 20 years? The answer is provided by the book by Ulf von Krause, retired lieutenant general, PhD in political science and economics: For decades, the structural features established at the founding of the Bundeswehr to 'contain' the new armed forces, along with a widespread societal rejection of the military, hindered the adaptation to the expanded range of tasks following the end of the East-West conflict. The author outlines the arduous process of overcoming legal, political, and historical obstacles for a 'normal' use of the military as an instrument of foreign policy and describes how positions in politics and society - domestic political goals, concealing the military's potential for violence, a civilian power mindset, and deficiencies in defining German interests - tended to come at the expense of the readiness and combat capability of the armed forces.