The author discusses, guided by Hermann Schmitz's 'New Phenomenology,' the core of this phenomenology, which is the critical revision and redefinition of self-consciousness and subjectivity. While self-consciousness was defined in German idealism as subject-object identity, the demonstration of the flaws in this understanding reveals the fundamental issues of reflexive self-identification. What 'I' am (subjectivity) in the sense of the New Phenomenology is confronted with older phenomenological approaches (Sartre, Husserl) and then utilized for the problem of you-evidence and solipsism. The basis of all reflexivity in the New Phenomenology is decisively the body. From the 'pre-reflexivity' and 'primitive presence' of the bodily, self-consciousness can then be newly defined as an 'unstable multiplicity' of chaotic ambivalences between pre-reflexivity and reflexivity. Part II of the book concretizes the level of bodily-affective involvement using the example of the feeling of shame. As a bodily 'constricting' feeling, it accentuates the personal subject because it particularly activates reflexivity rather than shutting it off (in contrast to joy and sadness, in which one can also lose oneself). In Sartre's work, the phenomenological characterization of the feeling of shame and the shame situation plays a significant role in his attempt to overcome solipsism, as this feeling's involvement seems to suggest something like you-evidence. Beyond the question of whether shame is always shame before others, i.e., always socially oriented, the author further discusses the alter-ego question in Part III of the book concerning Jean Paul Sartre, Edmund Husserl, and Hermann Schmitz.