The belief in the possibility of miracles has long been regarded as highly suspect in philosophical discussions. Particularly since David Hume's writings 'On Miracles', references to miracles are generally considered inadmissible evidence for the existence of God. To this day, numerous authors have further developed and refined the arguments for a dichotomy between rationality and belief in miracles.

But is the question of miracles really so easily resolved from a philosophical standpoint? This work suggests that arguments critical of miracles are far less plausible than commonly assumed.

Several of the most well-known critical positions on miracles are discussed. First, the possibility of defining miracles in connection with a proof of God in a non-circular manner is defended. Then, epistemological objections to the credibility of miracle reports are criticized, and the methodological question is examined as to whether scientific research is indeed hindered if an event is attributed a miraculous character. The conclusion involves a discussion of positions that specifically attack the Christian God as a miracle worker, for example, in the context of the problem of theodicy.